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THE NOTWITHSTANDING TABOO 
 
Richard McAdam, Dalhousie University 
Department of Political Science, M.A. Candidate 
 
 
The existence of the notwithstanding clause in s.33 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms allows the federal and provincial governments to overrule the fundamental freedoms 
and legal and equality rights of Canadian citizens. Built into the override is a sunset clause, 
requiring governments to renew any legislation using s.33 every five years. The government is 
also required to state explicitly which Charter rights are being overridden, though in the limited 
extent to which the override has been used, the invocation of s.33 has always been vague and 
proclaims to operate notwithstanding all of the relevant sections of the Charter to which the 
override applies, sections 2 (fundamental freedoms) and 7 to 15 (legal and equality rights).  
The constitutional entrenchment of rights for Canadians enhanced the institutional 
heritage of protecting rights through the rule of law, responsible government, and parliamentary 
sovereignty by adding judicial review to the Charter process.1 Through the notwithstanding 
clause, a balance was struck between Parliament’s supremacy and the courts, limiting the extent 
to which “the Supreme Court of Canada’s decisions must be obeyed by the legislatures”2 on 
issues subject to Charter review. This presents a two-track problem heretofore unseen in Canada: 
a government can either pass legislation that uses the override, explicitly violating rights; or, it 
can pass legislation that does not invoke s.33 but, upon judicial review, is found to transgress 
rights and is struck down by the courts. As Hogg notes, the Supreme Court no longer has the 
final word in cases involving ss.2 and 7-15, leaving the government to invoke the 
notwithstanding and end the debate.3 
 Yet in spite of the compromise aimed at strengthening the government’s legislative 
supremacy over the judiciary, it has been very reluctant to invoke s.33 to override the rights of 
Canadians. In fact, the federal government has never used the notwithstanding clause in the 
Charter era,4 and the provinces, other than Quebec, have only used it very sparingly. Why, 
having based the acceptability of the entire constitutional package on the insertion of the override 
clause, have the federal and provincial governments been loath to use it? The answer lies in the 
emergence of the taboo surrounding its usage. 
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 The objective of this paper will be to demonstrate the existence and force of the 
notwithstanding taboo, a barrier to its invocation that stems from a combination of normative 
opposition to violating Canadians’ rights and political-electoral interests. First, I construct the 
notion of taboo as functionally distinct from a convention or a norm, which renders the idea of 
utilizing the notwithstanding clause to the margins of their legislative strategy. Any invocation of 
s.33 would both violate the principle of respecting Charter rights and would cause political 
backlash that could significantly affect the governing party’s electoral fortunes. Second, I 
examine the evolution of this taboo surrounding the override clause, from its initial inception in 
John Diefenbaker’s Bill of Rights, which entered into force in 1960, through its modification and 
expansion in the Charter of Rights up to the present in order to determine the extent to which its 
demonization will restrict its usage in the future. It must be recalled that using the override 
clause now would break a pattern of 25 years of non-usage and holding the Charter of Rights 
sacrosanct at the federal level, which supports the argument that suggests that as time goes on 
and the continued practice of non-use endures, the likelihood of it being used continually 
decreases.5 The previous rights regime in Canada, governed by the Bill of Rights, endured for a 
decade before being temporarily suspended by Trudeau during the FLQ crisis and subsequently 
enduring a restriction on the freedom of association clause. For a rights regime that only enjoyed 
statutory status, this in itself is commendable and demonstrative of the strong tradition in 
Canadian government to follow the principles of the rule of law and responsible government. 
With the Charter of Rights entrenched in the Constitution, it holds even higher status in the 
minds of Canadians. Third, the paper examines a number of “near-miss” cases in which 
Canada’s prime ministers in the Charter era encountered situations in which using the 
notwithstanding clause was broached as a policy avenue to resolve policy problems. Brian 
Mulroney, Jean Chrétien, Paul Martin, and Stephen Harper have all had encounters with s.33, 
and all of them ultimately rejected its usage, either out of principle or political pragmatism. 
Finally, with the one aforementioned exception, the federal government has unfailingly defended 
and upheld the rights of Canadians for almost half a century. Is this reason to believe that the 
trend will continue? This question will be evaluated in the face of potential challenges to the 
taboo. 
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I: What Is a Taboo? 
In liberal democracies today there are only a small number of actions or policies that are 
considered “off-limits” for politicians and heads of government. They are generally affiliated 
with conducting foreign policy. The most prominent taboo in international relations involves 
using weapons of mass destruction, particularly nuclear weapons, as a legitimate instrument of 
warfare. The emphasis on “the bomb” does not suggest that utilizing chemical or biological 
weapons is less repugnant or deserving of less opprobrium by the “international community” in 
the event of their usage. What makes nuclear weapons stand out as a separate entity altogether is 
their sheer destructiveness and ability to instantly destroy thousands of lives and devastate the 
collective psychology of a state’s civilian population. It is for that reason a “normative 
prohibition on nuclear use has developed in the global system, which, although not (yet) a fully 
robust norm, has stigmatized nuclear weapons as unacceptable weapons of mass destruction.”6 
That factor, like other highly credible theories of deterrence and mutually assured destruction, 
plays a central role in considerations for avoiding the usage of weapons that could end a war 
within minutes. In the forum of public opinion, domestic and global, “nuke ‘em,” though a 
popular Hollywood film solution, is unacceptable as a legitimate policy option, all the more so 
for democratically accountable governments. 
 Nuclear weapons and Canada’s notwithstanding clause are not moral equivalents. Yet the 
past quarter-century, and indeed the past half-century if we acknowledge the override clause 
contained in the original Bill of Rights, has demonstrated that the invocation of s.33 would 
represent a political atomic bomb being dropped on the rights of Canadians.7 Peter Hogg, 
Canada’s foremost constitutional expert, predicted in 1982 that “the exercise of the [override] 
power would normally attract such political opposition that it would be rarely invoked; but the 
means of escape from the Charter is there without the necessity of a constitutional amendment.”8 
To one Charter analyst, that very fact “is an invitation to its use,” suggesting that “Parliament 
and the legislatures might be prone to accept this invitation.”9 Yet Parliament has not used its 
overriding power, and the legislatures have not done so with much enthusiasm as might have 
been expected by those who had predicted a “checkerboard” of rights in Canada. 
 In order to achieve the level of “taboo,” as opposed to convention (i.e. disallowance) or 
even a norm (i.e. a government adhering the will of Parliament and resigning after losing a vote 
of confidence), there are many factors which must come into coalition. Taboos are a certain, 
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elevated, type of norm, which can be defined as a “shared expectation of behaviour, a standard of 
right and wrong,”10 but they go further than norms in the extent to which they provoke 
opposition from both the public and its policy practitioners. Rather than being simply decisions 
or actions that political leaders do not undertake, taboos are policy choices they absolutely 
should not undertake because they are seen to lack legitimacy. 
What are the criteria that raise norms to taboos? First, there must be a strong opposition 
from the public to a certain policy. This is a voice which must be expressed in unqualified terms. 
It is not enough for the populace to express potential dissatisfaction regarding a policy outcome; 
citizens must reject the outcome as being illegitimate and express that pursuing that outcome will 
have dire consequences. This public reaction must profoundly affect the decision-making choices 
pursued by policy-makers, who will, if the public’s discourse on a notwithstanding taboo is 
sufficiently compelling, pursue what can be labeled “dilemmas of common aversion,” which 
“exist when all actors share a concern to avoid a particular outcome.”11 In the example of the 
emerging notwithstanding taboo, no political party, particularly at the federal level where the 
taboo is strongest, actively desires to use the notwithstanding clause because they believe that it 
will have major ramifications for their electoral hopes. There is an emerging consensus between 
both governing and governed regarding its usage: citizens largely oppose using the 
notwithstanding clause for any reason, and the Prime Minister and the Leader of the Opposition 
are both on record stating that they would not use the override.12 Beyond the political-electoral 
concerns, many prominent Canadian politicians have major reservations about limiting rights for 
any reason, no matter how “politically popular” or “justifiable” such an action may seem at the 
time. The idea that “rights are rights are rights” is a lofty standard held by many Canadians, and 
any infringement upon Charter rights would be viewed as a dangerous outcome because of 
potential future implications. 
 The power of a normative argument in the question of limiting or revoking rights thus 
takes shape in the “slippery slope” context: once the Pandora’s Box is opened, what is to prevent 
further exercises of override authority to systematically deprive Canadians of their rights? This 
notion arouses great concern among Canadians because of our fundamental attachment to rights 
as something intrinsic to our “expressions of our moral identity as a people” and which “give 
legal meaning to the values we care most about—dignity, equality, and respect.”13 Because 
Canadians hold rights so dearly, an appreciation for what we have and what we see when we 
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look at systemic human rights abuses in non-democratic states, we stand against any government 
that would infringe upon these rights. The onset of the Charter era fundamentally changed the 
way in which Canadians view rights, and Trudeau was exactly correct in his classification of the 
Charter as both a “sword and a shield on behalf of the average Canadian.”14 A shield, once 
chipped by an initial blow, becomes weakened, and thus once the initial usage of the 
notwithstanding clause occurs, there will, the pessimists argue, be less disinclination to use the 
override in the future. The “morality of the ballot box” holds considerable power over 
governments, and this is but the initial deterrent factor for politicians even considering opening 
the Pandora’s Box and going down the slippery slope. Though I do not fully agree with 
Monahan’s assessment that the notwithstanding clause “is obsolete in English Canada,”15 the 
extent to which it has been delegitimized at the federal level has rendered it essentially off-limits 
in Ottawa. The notwithstanding taboo remains less powerful among provinces; though they have 
not used it for over six years, that it has been used at all indicates greater boldness in defying the 
preference of the electorate. 
 The notwithstanding taboo has not prevented politicization of s.33 in recent years. The 
same-sex marriage debate was a powder-keg for all political parties for its impact on social 
norms, traditions, religious rights, and equality rights.16 The culmination of this series of events 
occurred in January 2006 when then-Prime Minister Paul Martin vowed that the first act of a re-
elected Liberal government would be to strip the federal government of its ability to invoke the 
notwithstanding clause. 
 The override power has thus become a political instrument used to instill in voters a fear 
of political parties who would suggest its usage. This begs the question: when Martin made his 
pledge, was it done because he genuinely believed that under no circumstances was there a 
compelling argument for usage of the override? Or was it done because he had planted the seed 
in peoples’ minds that Stephen Harper would use s.33 to deprive same-sex couples of their 
newly-acquired rights, breaking the notwithstanding taboo and thus potentially accepting future 
“invitations” to exercise that power? Martin’s own public record on the same-sex marriage issue 
suggests the latter. He had once speculated that in passing Bill C-38 he would use the 
notwithstanding clause to protect churches and religious associations from performing same-sex 
marriages against their religious beliefs, stating, “I would look at it if it was a question of 
affirming a religious right.”17 The government’s position had solidified by early 2005. Justice 
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Minister Irwin Cotler, himself a constitutional expert on the Charter and its limits in protecting 
rights under s.2 (which includes, inter alia, freedom of religion),18 stated, “Rights are rights are 
rights,” and any usage of s.33 “would really be an acknowledgment by the government that it is 
violating rights.”19 This paper will return to the debate in its discussion of future challenges to 
the notwithstanding taboo, but it is easy to see the effect this issue has already had, causing both 
proponents and opponents to demand the government invoke s.33 to protect rights, religious or 
equality, from being infringed by Bill C-38.  
The ultimate guarantor of the notwithstanding taboo is the trust and faith that Canadians 
place in their government to not abridge their rights. Thus far, they have earned that trust, and I 
concur with the assessment that “until the notwithstanding clause is abused ‘by some thwarting 
of the legitimate aspirations of a truly dispossessed or marginalized group in our society,’” 
Canada’s leaders do deserve the benefit of the doubt that they will uphold the notwithstanding 
taboo.20 Following the 2006 election campaign, during which the Martin Liberals often charged 
that the Conservatives would limit Charter rights via the notwithstanding clause, Stephen Harper 
spoke of the trust which the voters had placed in his party and in his pledge to avoid the use of 
s.33 to overturn same-sex marriage rights.21 Harper has thus come to understand the power of the 
notwithstanding taboo. The situation he faces as Prime Minister is different than that as Leader 
of the Opposition. When in government, policy-makers have greater authority and means to 
enact legislation; the message Harper received from the voters during the campaign was that 
rights are not to be bandied about as bartering tools. He now has a dilemma of aversion, and his 
past statements regarding the use of the notwithstanding clause may come into play in a future 
election regardless of his conduct in his first term. 
 
II: The Bill of Rights Regime 
A legitimate examination of the doctrines governing Canadians’ rights and freedoms must begin 
with the long-overlooked and ill-appreciated Bill of Rights that was passed by John 
Diefenbaker’s Conservative government in 1958 and entered into force in 1960. It must be 
remembered that until Diefenbaker, though Canada was a signatory to the United Nations’ 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, there existed no domestic legal code to protect 
the fundamental rights of Canadians. This was apparently not a problematic issue for citizens 
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until World War II brought to light the potential dangers of the absence of legislation protecting 
individual liberties from the state.22 
 In 1958, the Diefenbaker government enacted its Bill C-44, An Act for the Recognition 
and Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.23 A simple federal statute, the Bill 
of Rights contained many of the provisions existing in the current Charter regime, but it lacked 
constitutional entrenchment and its authority only extended to the federal government, which 
theoretically could amend or repeal its provisions in future sessions of Parliament. Although the 
Bill of Rights contained a provision guaranteeing “enjoyment of property, and the right not to be 
deprived thereof,”24 the lack of which in the Charter has been identified by Stephen Harper as a 
deficiency in Canada’s current rights regime and something he would seek to redress in the event 
of a reopened constitutional debate,25 property rights fall under provincial jurisdiction and thus 
could not be enforced under the Bill of Rights. 
 Yet many of the criticisms of the Bill of Rights are simplistic and overlook its actual 
historical record. In spite of its legal weaknesses and its own notwithstanding clause, the 
legislation was rarely tampered or challenged. It took a full decade after coming into force for a 
Bill of Rights case to reach Canada’s Supreme Court. In that first case, R. v. Drybones (1969), the 
Court ruled to enforce a provision of the Bill of Rights against a section of the Indian Act. The 
equality rights of Aboriginals-as-Canadians were upheld in opposition of the Indian Act’s 
provision that it is a crime for Aboriginals to be intoxicated “anywhere off a reserve.”26 Because 
it is not illegal for non-Aboriginal Canadians to be intoxicated in most areas, the Indian Act was 
thus found to be discriminatory and the Court ruled appropriately. As such, the casual dismissal 
of the Bill of Rights today is inconsistent with its legal achievements affirming Canadians’ rights. 
At the political level, the Bill of Rights was also accorded a measure of respect and 
deference. For the course of its existence politicians dared not suggest weakening or repealing its 
provisions else they be attached to the label of disregarding the rights of Canadians. 
Diefenbaker’s Conservatives, the same party that introduced Canada’s “New Deal” legislation 
during the Great Depression, highlight the unique character of Canadian conservatism, which 
expresses “an element of ‘tory democracy’—the paternalistic concern for the condition of the 
people.”27 This is distinct from American conservatism, which desires to preserve the bourgeois 
liberal traditions such as individual liberty and democratic capitalism; whereas the American 
“Republican is always a liberal,” a Canadian Conservative “may be at one moment a liberal, at 
   
  8 
the next moment a tory, and is usually something of both.”28 Thus, having introduced the Bill of 
Rights and staked out turf in a previously tabula rasa territory domestically,29 the Tories would 
subsequently portray themselves as the champions of rights in Canada. Though Diefenbaker 
despaired at court judgments of the 1970s indicating a “desire to chisel away at some of the 
freedoms” prescribed by the Bill, he remained proud of his accomplishment.30  
Yet for the majority of the Bill of Rights’ existence as Canada’s preeminent rights 
document, Canada was governed by Liberals. Lester Pearson defeated Diefenbaker in 1963 and 
was succeeded by Pierre Trudeau in 1968. Trudeau in particular viewed individual rights as of 
great importance, yet it was under his leadership that the Bill of Rights would face its greatest 
challenge. First, during the FLQ crisis, the Bill was temporarily suspended, and the police were 
given tremendous emergency powers to deal with the terrorists. Trudeau’s statement of 16 
October 1970 indicates his reluctance in suspending rights even in the wake of a genuine 
national security threat: 
These are strong powers and I find them as distasteful as I am sure you do. They are 
necessary, however, to permit the policy to deal with persons who advocate or promote 
the violent overthrow of our democratic system. In short, I assure you that the 
Government recognizes its grave responsibilities in interfering in certain cases with civil 
liberties, and that it remains answerable to the people of Canada for its actions. The 
government will revoke this proclamation as soon as possible.31 
 
Technically, Trudeau’s invocation of the War Measures Act did not constitute a breach of the 
notwithstanding taboo. The Bill of Rights, in s.6, stated that “any action taken under the War 
Measures Act ‘shall be deemed not to be an abrogation, abridgement or infringement of any right 
or freedom’” contained therein.32 It was the subsequent passage of the Public Order (Temporary 
Measures) Act, which declared the FLQ an illegal organization, under s.3, and any person who, 
inter alia: 
a. is or professes to be a member of the unlawful association; 
b. acts or professes to act as an officer of the unlawful association 
to be “guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment.33 The Act made explicit 
reference, in s.12, to its operation notwithstanding the Bill of Rights. The “freedom of 
association” clause was thus limited for the six-month duration of the Act’s operation, marking 
the only occasion that Canada’s federal government has deviated from the normative principle of 
non-usage of a notwithstanding clause. 
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 An outcome of the usage of the notwithstanding clause in this instance does deserve 
mention for potential future cases under the current Charter regime. In a time of national 
security, Canadians’ rights were restricted and “no civil liberties arguments were raised… [and] 
civil libertarians, and defence lawyers amongst them, had ‘estopped’ [sic] themselves from 
raising these issues.”34 The implications for rights in the event of a terrorist attack or other 
national security emergency could be severe, and it will fall upon Canadians to enforce the 
notwithstanding taboo to prevent the government from engaging in “lesser evil” tactics such as 
those undertaken by Trudeau in the name of security. 
 
III: Birth of the Charter Regime 
The Charter of Rights and Freedoms represents one of Canada’s most significant political and 
constitutional achievements. It is a document that citizens can look to with pride and honour as a 
symbol of Canada’s liberal democracy and respect for the rule of law. As earlier stated, it 
fundamentally altered Canadians’ perception of rights to a level unseen during the previous 
rights regime. For Trudeau and Jean Chrétien, the Prime Minister and the Minister of Justice at 
the time and the central actors for the federal government, the inclusion of an entrenched Charter 
in the Constitution represented the culmination of a process both had long advocated since their 
election to Parliament in the 1960s. Both were elected in the era of the Bill of Rights, and neither 
felt that it went far enough in guaranteeing Canadians’ liberties. The Charter solved that 
dilemma. 
 The achievement was not an unqualified success. Indeed, the compromise required to get 
provincial governments on board—the inclusion of the override provision via s.33 of the 
Charter—was a humiliation for Trudeau. When asked if he had traded away rights to make a 
deal, at the expense of a potential “checkerboard” Canada in which some provinces respected 
rights but others did not, Trudeau could only respond, “Yes.”35 Moreover, the first ministers’ 
negotiations were concluded without the collaboration of Quebec. Its government reacted to the 
snub by opting out of the Charter “to the maximum extent possible … by introducing a 
‘notwithstanding clause’ into each of its existing” and subsequent statutes in a demonstration of 
the political illegitimacy of the Constitution in the province.36 While the rest of the country 
celebrated, Quebec’s flags flew at half-mast. The problems involving Quebec separatism and its 
view of the legitimacy of Canada post-1982 are numerous and beyond the scope of this paper; 
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however, the story of Quebec and the Charter serves as an excellent analogy to the concept of 
rights in Canada. Like consent for the Constitution, Charter freedoms are not absolute and 
unequivocal.  
 From an electoral standpoint, a government that takes rights away from citizens risks 
jeopardizing its future success. Rights and liberties are essential tenets in liberal democracies 
such as Canada, and governments seeking to act, even in times of crisis, are playing with fire 
when they broach the subject of curtailing rights as a “lesser evil” in the face of a national 
security emergency. As Michael Ignatieff correctly states, “A government seeking to respond to 
an attack or an expected danger is required to present the case for extraordinary measures to a 
legislature, to argue for them with reasons that might convince a reasonable person, and to alter 
the measures in the face of criticism.”37 The government will then be answerable for such 
measures at the time of the next election, and questions will arise whether suspending or 
overriding rights was justified.  
 
IV: The Notwithstanding Taboo in the Charter Era 
The Charter era of rights in Canada is now in its twenty-fifth year; it is a testament to the power 
of the notwithstanding taboo that “seven of the ten provinces and two of the three territories have 
never used the power of override; nor has the federal Parliament.”38 As the following discussion 
demonstrates, there have been debates in which political actors have contemplated the use of s.33 
but avoided its usage, deterred by various ethical and electoral factors. Yet even in those isolated 
cases outside of Quebec where the override has been invoked, it has ultimately re-enforced the 
taboo. 
 When the first ministers came to agree on the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, many 
actors moved to immediately establish their position regarding the notwithstanding clause. To 
provide themselves political cover in the wake of their compromise on the Charter, Trudeau and 
Chrétien both put up a parliamentary supremacy-based defence of the override clause, the former 
asserting, “I don’t fear the notwithstanding clause very much,” while Chrétien advanced the 
notion that the role of s.33 was a tool to provide “flexibility” to legislatures in having the final 
word on “important matters of public policy.”39 Though the federal government’s principal 
actors portrayed the override clause as a balance-of-power instrument, many analysts have 
disagreed with this initial conception, and I certainly concur that this defence is merely a means 
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of deflecting discussion away from the significance of their compromise to the provinces that 
helped bring the Charter into existence. The critics focus on the compromise with the provinces 
in order to gain consensus on the constitutional package as the true purpose behind s.33’s 
existence. Manitoba, Quebec, and Saskatchewan had all outright opposed entrenchment of the 
Charter, while other provinces had expressed varying degrees of support upon certain conditions 
and concessions.40 Thus the notwithstanding clause “had more to do with the raw politics of 
bargaining and chance phone calls late at night than with reasoned debate about what might 
constitute a rational compromise between democracy and constitutional law.”41 Taken in that 
light, there is little doubt as to the reasons Trudeau avoided discussion regarding potential 
applications of s.33 to future legislation, even in the anticipatory sense to ward off “possible 
negative judicial intervention”42 that would become its norm in future years. His statement about 
not fearing the override clause was not based on using it without repercussions, but rather on the 
secure knowledge that he would not be utilizing it during his tenure. 
 
V: The Taboo in Full Force: Ottawa and s.33 
The strongest evidence in support of the existence of a normative basis for the non-use of the 
notwithstanding clause is the fact that it has never been utilized by the federal government. 
Moreover, there exists only scant evidence that Ottawa has ever even considered using the 
override power to limit or restrict Charter freedoms. Because the federal government is perceived 
to be a unifying actor responsible for the ominous task of shaping “public demands and 
expectations” and respecting all Canadians as “individuals endowed with common rights,”43 it 
sets the national standard by which, it is hoped, all other governments will behave regarding 
Charter rights. Were Ottawa to invoke s.33, it could conceivably induce the provinces to do 
likewise. For that reason, among others, the federal government has exercised a self-imposed ban 
on using the override power. 
 When Paul Martin stated that his first act if re-elected in the 2006 federal election would 
be to pass legislation to strip the federal government’s power to use the override, some viewed 
his statement as a means of putting into force what has been a long-standing convention. 
However, many critics saw Martin’s concept as short-sighted and unnecessarily tipping the 
balance of power in favour of the unelected judiciary. The Supreme Court decision in Multani v. 
Commission scolaire Marguerite-Bourgeoys (2006), which held that the Sikh religious practice 
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of wearing the kirpan was violated by a school board’s decision to restrict the custom, is a 
potential case for the use of the override clause. The decision overturned the Quebec Court of 
Appeals’ ruling that the ban was justified on the grounds of “reasonable limits” in ensuring 
public safety.44 Had Martin won re-election, the idea of using s.33 would have been off the table 
for a federal ban on wearing the kirpan in public places such as schools.45 In her statement 
representing the majority opinion, Justice Charron wrote: 
A total prohibition against wearing a kirpan to school undermines the value of this 
religious symbol and sends students the message that some religious practices do not 
merit the same protection as others…It is incumbent on the schools to discharge their 
obligations to instill in their students this value that is at the very foundation of our 
democracy.46 
 
As such, the Harper government avoided action—indeed, even comment—on this issue to 
redress parental concerns that some students at school are carrying what can be considered a 
weapon, aware it would have to use the override to curtail a religious freedom.47 For a 
government that in opposition fought in the name of religious freedoms against same-sex 
marriage, this would have been a decidedly awkward situation. 
 Should the Harper government continue to avoid discussion of invoking s.33 to overturn 
a Court decision, it will follow in a lengthy tradition of prime ministers who have resisted the 
temptation of override. Indeed, nearly every Canadian leader during the Charter era has 
encountered a situation in which they encountered extra-parliamentary pressures to break 
tradition and invoke s.33 on a pressing matter. As earlier discussed, Trudeau was superbly 
confident that he would not be compelled to use the override, and his retirement from politics in 
1984 meant that he was Prime Minister for only a very short time after the Charter came into 
force. John Turner and Kim Campbell’s short tenures as place-holders following the departures 
of Trudeau and Brian Mulroney, respectively, essentially excluded them from any major 
decisions about the notwithstanding clause,48 and it is still early in Stephen Harper’s rule to 
gauge what he will do. That leaves Mulroney, Jean Chrétien, and Paul Martin as the three prime 
ministers who have encountered the notwithstanding clause at length during their tenures. 
 Brian Mulroney’s position on the notwithstanding clause is very clear. He had contempt 
for Trudeau’s compromise, stating in a House of Commons speech, “Never before in our history 
has a Prime Minister of Canada made a concession of such magnitude and importance. Never 
before has the surrender of rights been so total and abject.”49 Mulroney thus had a normative 
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opposition to the very existence of s.33, rendering the likelihood of its usage under his 
stewardship out of the question. His discussion of s.33 in the context of the Meech Lake Accord 
was the Quebec’s acceptance of the Constitution would relegate the idea of “opting out of 
Canada” via s.33 to illegitimate status in the province, much as it had become in the rest of 
Canada. Mandel has noted that Mulroney’s discussion of the notwithstanding clause served to 
demonstrate “how potent a symbol of evil” it was in English Canada.50 
 At the same time as the Meech debate was taking place, a political firestorm erupted 
following the Supreme Court’s verdict in the Morgentaler (1988) case to strike down the federal 
government’s abortion legislation on grounds under s.7 of the Charter (“life, liberty, and the 
security of the person”). The debate between conservatives, who hold the view that a fetus is a 
person who enjoys the “right to life,” and liberals, who contend that so does a mother with the 
right to freedom of action, was furious. It engaged Parliament to draft new legislation that 
provided some restriction while still accounting for s.7 rights. A series of bills were defeated in 
the House of Commons, ultimately resulting in Mulroney abandoning the issue to tackle higher-
priority items on his agenda. 
 In none of those legislative efforts, including the most restrictive of the proposed bills—
Bill C-43, which would have sentenced “doctors to two years in jail for performing abortions 
where a woman’s health is not at risk”51—could I discover any mention by the government of 
using s.33, though external pressures abounded. Mulroney did not want to risk legitimizing the 
override clause by invoking it on the abortion issue, and his leadership stands as the most 
profound period of normative opposition to the override. 
 Despite the mega-constitutional and national unity issues that were a hallmark of the first 
two of Chrétien’s three majority terms, the only occasion in which the notion of using the 
override power occurred in the case of RJR-MacDonald v. Canada (1995). The Supreme Court 
struck down legislation banning tobacco advertising, ruling that the tobacco companies’ freedom 
of expression rights were unconstitutionally restricted.52 The Court’s opinion was that the ban 
deprived both Big Tobacco and the consumer of disseminating and receiving information 
relating to the health risks and other considerations in tobacco usage.53 This was a case in which 
the public may have supported government action to limit the rights of a corporation that is 
responsible for numerous health risks and terminal diseases, yet Chrétien astutely chose to avoid 
the fray. Public opinion had turned solidly against the tobacco companies; as one advertising 
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executive stated, “They'd [tobacco companies] have to be brain dead to thumb their noses at 
public opinion and the government."54 As it stands, the only advocate in Parliament this writer 
could find in support of using the override in this case was the NDP’s Ed Broadbent and other 
members of that party.55 
 As the Chrétien years wore on into the new century, the movement towards legalizing 
same-sex marriage gained considerable momentum. In preventing the opposition parties from 
passing a bill that required the government to take “all necessary steps” to protect the traditional 
definition of marriage, Chrétien re-framed the debate into a referendum on the notwithstanding 
clause. His success in doing so, and in defeating the opposition bill, was seen as “indicative of a 
growing convention” that s.33 should never be used by any government.56 He viewed the Charter 
as a living and active document and did not want to preclude sexual orientation from any 
dialogue between Parliament and the Supreme Court, stating that it was an “open-ended” debate 
and for “the court to decide” whether sexual orientation should fall under s.15 of the Charter.57 
Chrétien demonstrated that he had no intention of using s.33 in the same-sex marriage debate; his 
normative opposition to the notwithstanding clause was based on his belief that there should be 
dialogue between the legislative and judicial branches.58 By the 2000 election campaign, 
Chrétien had turned entirely against the override clause that he had once given a small vestige of 
support for including in the Charter. Referring to s.33 as “a nice way to destroy the Charter of 
Rights,” and expressing his pride that no federal government used the override,59 Chrétien laid 
the groundwork for the permanent opposition to the use of the override by the Liberals. Though 
his successor did broach the subject, advocacy of invoking the override has largely emanated 
from Conservatives, something which Liberals will pinpoint as emblematic of a “hidden agenda” 
of their electoral opponents. 
Though he had signaled support for legalization of same-sex marriage, Chrétien was 
unable to pass a bill before leaving office and being succeeded by Paul Martin. This story is 
interwoven with that of Stephen Harper’s attitude towards the notwithstanding clause, and thus 
both will be discussed here. During the course of the debate, both proponents and opponents of 
same-sex marriage broached the idea of the necessity to invoke the notwithstanding clause. 
Martin engaged both sides of the debate; it will be recalled that he had suggested using the 
override to affirm religious freedoms on the matter. In the end, he rejected both camps’ overtures 
and avoided the use of s.33 to either affirm religious freedoms or override equality rights. Now 
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that same-sex marriage has been legalized, it is “highly unlikely you’re going to be able to re-
institute the opposite-sex definition of marriage without using the notwithstanding clause.”60  
Paul Martin’s opposition to the notwithstanding clause did not appear to be based on the 
same normative attitude held by his predecessor, given his musing about using it during the 
debate. Political considerations played a larger part in his decision-making than the 
notwithstanding taboo, making him a unique case in this study. His idea of legislating s.33 out of 
Parliament was hastily concocted, and reportedly Martin never brought it up with the 
constitutional scholars in his Cabinet.61 During the election campaign, Harper pledged to not use 
the override to overturn C-38, a break from past stances, indicating that the political 
ramifications of the notwithstanding taboo have impacted his decision-making process. Thus 
there has been a convergence between ideals and political pragmatism among Canada’s leaders 
which has made the use of the notwithstanding clause a taboo topic in contemporary Canadian 
political discourse. 
 
Conclusions: The Future of the Notwithstanding Clause 
When examining the historical record involving the federal government’s non-use of the 
notwithstanding clause it is tempting to agree with Monahan’s contention that s.33 is “obsolete” 
in English Canada. Given that it has now been over fifteen years since Quebec last invoked the 
override, one could argue that it has now become a taboo in that province as well. There are 
profound arguments to be made against using the override either preemptively or in reaction vis-
à-vis rulings from the judicial branch. Regarding preemption, Hiebert provides the best 
argument: 
The override should not be used pre-emptively, to preclude judicial review, because this 
would circumvent conversation and deny the polity of the benefits of hearing the 
judiciary’s concerns about the effects of the legislation for protected rights.62 
 
On reaction, refer to Cotler’s statement that to use the notwithstanding clause is to acknowledge 
that the government is violating rights of Canadians.63 Regardless of when, the invocation of s.33 
by any government has substantial political consequences that will more than likely have 
negative effects on that government’s hopes for re-election. 
 But does this truly indicate that s.33 is a dead letter in Canadian politics? National 
security and public safety have trumped rights in the past, and the potential for a repeat of history 
certainly exists. Bill C-36, Canada’s counterterrorism legislation passed after 9/11, may yet clash 
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with rights and freedoms. The enhancement of policy authority has a historical parallel in the 
War Measures Act, and concerns have arisen that judicial control over “search-and-seizure, 
arrest, and surveillance powers,” all of which fall under the Charter umbrella in ss.7-14, may be 
insufficient to prevent abuses.64 A terrorist attack in Canada would almost certainly provoke 
enhanced state powers and possibly include a temporary suspension of civil liberties. If Trudeau, 
the champion of individual liberties, suspended rights, it is not beyond the scope of the possible 
that it could happen again. 
 Additionally, religious freedoms and minority groups demanding equality are two key 
challenges to the notwithstanding taboo. The decision in Multani (2006) establishes a conflict 
between a religious expression and public safety concerns. It would only take one incident of the 
ceremonial dagger being utilized in self-defence to provoke public outcry for the government to 
use s.33 to protect children. It thus, as Justice Charron stated, falls on schools to educate children 
to respect other groups and promote tolerance of the religious practices of Canada’s minorities. 
 Tolerance and respect are at the heart of minority group rights, but often the majority, in 
conceding equality rights, does not give its approval and limits its expression to a “merely 
reluctant tolerance” of minority groups.65 As more and more groups demand the “unconditional 
surrender” of the majority to give their approval in granting rights,66 there will occasionally arise 
a backlash among the majority. Some will argue that society is “not ready” to grant approval of 
particular minority interests—‘swingers clubs’ and polygamist groups readily come to mind—
and there will be considerable pressure on governments to act preemptively to forestall any 
possibility of these claims for rights gaining acceptability. These claims must be evaluated on a 
case-by-case basis for their applicability to either Charter rights or the Criminal Code, and those 
which fall under the former could be restricted via the notwithstanding clause.67 It is difficult to 
predict a government’s response to such hypothetical scenarios; a Conservative government 
would face immense pressure from its electoral base of support to use any means necessary to 
indefinitely ban polygamy. If it chose to use s.33, however, the Tories would arouse considerable 
outrage from those who view any use of the override as illegitimate, even if to outlaw practices 
that a majority of the population deems immoral. 
 The ultimate question thus remains: does a notwithstanding taboo exist and will it 
continue to deter governments from using s.33 to override Charter rights? Because the Charter is 
held to such lofty standards by Canadians, to a greater extent than the Bill of Rights, and because 
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it provides “a living constitution for a liberal democratic state … [recognizing] the equal human 
dignity of all members of Canadian society,”68 governments must be extremely cautious in even 
publicly contemplating its use. For Ottawa to cross the Rubicon and actually use s.33 for any 
purpose, no matter how defensible, would signify a serious breach of trust and respect for the 
values of Canadians. No Prime Minister of Canada wants to be known as the first leader to 
deprive rights to a minority group in Canada or make illegal any action or expression that is 
protected by the Charter. 
 Thus, I respond to the above question in the affirmative. Norms “do not determine 
outcomes” and are confined to influencing “the probability of occurrence of certain courses of 
action.”69 Yet to deny that there is an obstacle beyond realist electoral considerations seems 
inappropriate and overlooks the normative statements by leaders such as Mulroney and Trudeau, 
and academics such as Mandel (who, it will be recalled, described s.33 as “evil”). It is 
exceedingly difficult to predict the future in political science, but given elected officials’ 
reluctance to wade into the murky waters of the notwithstanding debate and 25 years of historical 
non-use weighing on their minds as a political barrier, some measure of certainty can be 
exercised in stating that the state’s ability to “pursue compelling legislation” to infringe rights70  
may yet become truly “obsolete” in the same fashion as the federal Parliament’s power of 
disallowance. 
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